From Slate: JPMorgan was supposed to be among the best
managers of bank risk in the world. This week it published an internal report
into the failings which led to $6.2 billion of trading losses at its chief
investment office in 2012. If the mix revealed – conflicting mandates,
discredited theory, inadequate checks and primitive technology – is really as
good as it gets, financial watchdogs and investors everywhere should worry.
There are plenty of lessons for regulators and bank execs who want things done
right.
First, the controls should match the mission of a unit that
manages excess cash, as the CIO did, and is trying to make money in the
process. The report suggests JPMorgan’s supervision was set for the days when
the CIO was a sleepier and much smaller operation which engaged in simple,
old-fashioned hedging. Not enough changed when the CIO morphed into a trading
operation that was a force in the market for complex synthetic credit default
swaps. One trader was nicknamed the London Whale in press reports.
In particular, the CIO was under pressure to minimize
reported risk. Models are used to calculate the measures of risk: risk-weighted
assets (RWA), used to calculate capital strength, and value-at-risk (VaR), used
to estimate likely losses. When the models suggested that some assets should be
sold to keep the risk at an acceptable level, the unit’s traders sometimes just
tried to change the models (i.e. move around the deck chairs…)
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